Unresolved Issues with the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator

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Key theoretical assumptions underlying the MBTI are examined and questioned in an attempt to clarify Jung’s vs. Myers’ theories, and to explore the implications of applying the MBTI outside the context of Jungian theory and its dynamics of the psyche.

Abstract

This paper discusses four issues related to the MBTI that appear to need theoretical clarification and discussion. Differences between Jungian theory and Myers’ theory are described, as well as the resulting implications for the operationalisation of the theory with the MBTI. While general differences between types have received much attention, the more subtle structural assumptions underlying the MBTI have been relatively ignored. The four areas discussed are: (a) whether the J-P dimension can determine the dominant function; (b) the attitude of the auxiliary and whether it is antagonistic to and/or complementary to the dominant; (c) whether everybody is a type; (d) the potential difficulties of using the MBTI outside the context of the overall Jungian theory of the psyche.

As McCaulley (1989) has recently stated, the MBTI is now “one of the most widely used psychological measures, and is being translated into languages on every continent. The explosion has brought the MBTI into the spotlight” (p. 13). In the process of coming into the light, users and advocates may be required to answer difficult questions, to address some of the unresolved issues with the MBTI. As Lawrence (1986) has argued, “Anyone who explains and interprets MBTI results will be asked questions about the instrument, and some of them will be tough questions that go right to the heart of the construction issues” (p. 2).

The present paper seeks to highlight some selected critical areas where theoretical ambiguity still exists and, as a result, questions about the MBTI still remain. The choice of the issues was determined, on the one hand, by their importance to the standing of the MBTI and, on the other hand, by my own personal prejudice. The paper’s purpose is to provide and provoke discussion in those areas where more debate seems needed. It is not intended to provide an empirical review of those issues. It is improved understanding of Jungian theory and greater conceptual precision that are as important at this juncture of MBTI history as empirical validation. This would certainly appear to be the case in non-American (particularly European) countries. Indeed, the catalyst for this article was observation of cross-cultural difficulties in teaching the MBTI and Myers’ theory in countries where there is a pre-existing knowledge of Jungian theory.

Background

The relationship between type theory and the instrument intended to operationalise it occurs between three levels: (1) Jung’s theory of types (Jung, 1971); (2) Myers’ theory of types (Myers & Myers, 1980); and (3) the MBTI instrument.

It would appear to be a useful exercise to explore the differences between Jung’s and Myers’ type theories and the implications of those differences. One unresolved difficulty with the MBTI is the ambiguity still present in its relationship with the underlying theory it is supposed to operationalise. For example, some researchers attempt to validate Myers’ theory of type, and some attempt to validate Jung’s theory of type. The one is not the same as the other. A failure to distinguish between the two theories, or to attribute to Jung ideas that are part of Myers’ or MBTI theory, can diminish or even invalidate respect for the MBTI. The present paper focuses on those areas where reference to “type theory” is confusing unless it specifies which type theory is being used.

Arising from this theoretical ambiguity is the fact that some of the subtle, but fundamental, aspects of the MBTI do not have as much rigorous support as...
the more general (and more easily measured) reliability and validity aspects. While the Manual (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) cites many studies which validate the general properties of the theory, such as occupational classifications of the preferences, and criterion-based correlations of the preferences, almost all of these studies are validating the existence of the broad categories only, and their effect on our choices, behaviour, or attitudes. In effect such studies (as well as the classic studies of Carlyn, 1977; Richek, 1969; Stricker & Ross, 1963, 1964a) may validate no more than a trait interpretation of the scales. Such studies do not validate the critical structural assumptions of the typological theory. Finding a significant positive relationship between the S-N scale and IQ tests provides support for the notion that differences on the whole S-N scale (or increasing N) means "something." However, such a result does not address such MBTI assumptions as that S and N are truly dichotomous types, or that the scale measures degree of preference, not degree of development.

More important is the question whether these deeper assumptions are, in any event, part of Jungian theory, or based on Myers' theory. It is precisely the structure of type theory that needs addressing, not another study showing which types populate a type table in a particular occupation. Indeed, a number of the basic building blocks of Myers' theory have barely been examined, and where they have, the evidence has not always been supportive (Carlson, 1985).

Researchers whose reviews of the MBTI have been somewhat critical (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1989; Stricker & Ross, 1964b), are often attempting to validate the structural properties of Jung's theory. This explains the apparently contradictory nature of such (negative) assessments of the MBTI relative to the wealth of supporting data in the Manual. One of the reasons for this difference in assessments might be the lack of conceptual clarity referred to above. If haziness exists between the theories of Jung and Myers, then it would not be surprising for the deeper and more refined assumptions not to have been satisfactorily examined empirically. For this reason, this paper concentrates on clarifying the theoretical basis of the MBTI and not on the validation or empirical work already performed or needing to be performed.

Related to this, both the empirical and practical use of the MBTI have become not only independent of the Jungian theory of psychological types, but also separate from the Jungian theory of the psyche as a whole. Taking only part of Jungian theory produces a very different range of ideas than taking the whole theory. Recent MBTI applications, particularly to organisations, appear to take the MBTI theory further and further away from the Jungian theory. Increasingly, these applications have become more focused and more prescriptive. In doing so, much of what is most critical and unique in the Jungian approach to understanding the dynamics of personality has been lost. The last section of the present paper attempts to illustrate the difficulties that will result if this approach is translated into action.

The arguments in this paper set out the author's interpretations of Jung's and Myers' theories. These interpretations cannot be definitive, any more than Myers' interpretation of Jung can be. Such potential diversity merely argues for an open debate.

(a) Does the J-P dimension determine the extraverted function and, hence, the dominant function?

The Judging-Perceiving dimension is an important addition to type theory. One of the difficult tasks confronting Myers was to provide a way to determine which function was dominant and which was auxiliary. Her method for doing this was the creation of the J-P dimension, designed to measure which function is used outwardly, since, in her view, this would determine indirectly which function is the dominant and which is the auxiliary. The J-P dimension is usually explained as making explicit a concept that was implicit in Jungian theory. Jung certainly described people in terms of being "judging" or "perceiving" types, this designation referring to someone with a judging function dominant (thinking or feeling), or a perceiving function dominant (intuition or sensing). This is stated very clearly; e.g., "I call the two preceding types (extraverted thinking and extraverted feeling) rational or judging types because they are characterised by the supremacy of the reasoning and judging functions" (Jung, 1971, p. 359).

To Jung, the introverted judging types (or introverted rational types) refer to the introverted thinking and introverted feeling types—i.e., where thinking and feeling are dominant (Jung, 1971).

Note that this is a very different formulation than the terms "judging" or "perceiving" as used in Myers' theory. In the latter, being a J or a P refers not to having a judging function or a perceiving function dominant, but to having a judging function or a perceiving function extraverted. In Myers' theory (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), for introverts a judging type has a dominant perceiving function.

To some degree the above difference is purely one of terminology, and being consistent within one theoretical framework or another is what is critical. However, the J-P addition to the theory is not just making a Jungian idea "explicit"; it is much more than that.

Some authors have argued that the very notion of a separate J-P dimension is actually contrary to Jungian theory. In his review of the MBTI, Coan (1978) described the addition of the J-P index as an
"interesting innovation" that "appears to constitute a departure from Jungian theory, since the Jungian typology does not presuppose a tendency of people to favor judgment over perception or vice versa. An emphasis on either mode of judgment is balanced by de-emphasis of the opposite mode, and the same principle applies to the two perceptual modes" (p. 974). In other words, at a theoretical level one may have a dominant judging function, but one does not thereby have a judging orientation over a perceiving one, since the inferior function is similarly judging and negates the effect of the judging nature of the dominant.

In addition, the notion that each person has an "extraverted function," which for extraverts is the dominant and for introverts is the auxiliary, is a rationale derived from Myers' formulation of type theory. In other words, the assumption that introverts use an extraverted auxiliary for the outer world, an assumption that directly underpins the use of the J-P dimension as a pointer to the dominant function, is Myers' own. Whether or not it is also Jung's is certainly a matter for debate.

There are, then, a number of sources of theoretical difference between Jung and Myers with respect to the notion of being judging or perceiving. When considering the operationalisation with the MBTI, we need to be clear that it is Myers' theory and not Jung's theory that forms the primary and direct basis. In any event, there are concerns about whether or not the MBTI has satisfactorily operationalised Myers' theory. The basis of assuming that J-P measures which function is extraverted derives from the wording of the items in the questionnaire. This is explained in McCaulley (1981) as follows: "If one could know whether the extraverted function is a perception or a judgment function, then one could also identify the (extraverted) dominant for the extraverted types and the (extraverted) auxiliary for the introverted types" (p. 302). Behavioural characteristics associated with extraverting of a perceiving function or a judging function had been noted. As a result, a "fourth index, the judgment perception (J-P) index was developed to tap these behavioural indicators... the J-P index is designed to elicit attitudes and behaviours that are extraverted" (pp. 302-303). As a method of resolving the difficulty in determining dominant or auxiliary, this solution is ingenious. There are two problems with it, however.

The most serious problem is that we don't know if it actually works. Coan (1978) describes the rationale in the Manual as "an intriguing bit of psychometric reason, but it has not been satisfactorily validated. The JP preference has been found in research applications to discriminate in useful ways, but its value in assessing Jungian types remains doubtful" (p. 630). In other words, it is an assumption that the J-P scale determines which type of function is used in the outer world, an assumption which has not yet been satisfactorily validated. We do not yet know whether or not the J-P scale does point to the extraverted function and, hence, indirectly to the dominant function. Remarkably few studies have attempted to validate the assumption that the J-P dimension can be used to determine the dominant function. Those which have, such as Carlyn (1980) and McCrae and Costa (1989), did not find support for the MBTI method as a means of assessing the Jungian function. Both these studies used preference scores or standardized preference scores as an alternative indicator of dominance on the grounds that the dominant is, by definition, the most preferred, a theoretical assertion made by Myers and McCaulley (1985); i.e., that "the dominant function will show a clearer preference than will the auxiliary" (p. 58). No doubt there exist arguments against such a research design or their particular way of assessing dominance, yet the fact remains that even if one were to reject their findings, one would still be left needing support for Myers' hypothesis. In summary, the Myers method of determining the dominant function, using the J-P dimension, may not be the best method; most assuredly it is not the only method, and should for the present be treated as a working hypothesis, not as an established fact.

The second problem with Myers' solution of using a J-P index to determine the dominant and auxiliary functions is with its logic rather than with its variation. As indicated above, the J-P dimension was derived after noting the behavioural characteristics associated with extraverting a perceiving function or a judging function. To the extent that this logic rests on the assumption that our behaviour is determined only by the conscious (dominant or auxiliary) function, we need to be careful. For example, as Jung (1971) cautions with respect to extraverted judging types, outward behaviour is determined as much by our unconscious functions. The question this poses for the MBTI is whether the J-P index, even if it does assess extraverted functioning, can isolate that extraverted behaviour that derives from a conscious function but not from an unconscious function.

However, there are some a priori reasons why the J-P index may not indicate the extraverted function in spite of the intention that it do so. Assessing the rationale behind the J-P index is difficult, since the precise logical justification for exactly how it performs its assigned role is unclear. Is a respondent supposed to be in an extraverted mode when responding to J-P items (but not S-N and T-F items)? Are the items supposed to directly gauge extraverted behaviour, or are they supposed to intrinsically express an outer-world context? The assumption in this paper is that the J-P index performs its assigned role
through the content of the items themselves suggesting an outer-world reference, and thus the questionnaire response reflects the nature of the function used to deal with the outer world. If this assumption is correct, the question arises whether the J-P items do evoke an outer-world reference but the S-N items and T-F items are substantively different and do not also do so. A cursory reading of the items does not reveal that the S-N and T-F items are any different from the J-P items in that regard.

Looking at the J-P items alone, it is conceivable that the phrase items evoke an outer-world reference or that their content has an outer-world reference, but what about the context-free word pairs? How can a word-pair evoke the context of dealing with the outer world? Even a word-pair that one might presume to be relevant only in an outer-world sense (e.g., scheduled vs. unplanned), may not refer to one's extraverted function. For example, it may be possible for one's introverted function to be concerned with the "scheduled" option and for the scheduling to occur in one's inner world; yet one might deal with the outer world in an unplanned way. If the word-pair evokes the introverted orientation or has an inner-world reference (for whatever reason), then such a J-P option cannot, in that instance, be measuring what it is supposed to be measuring—i.e., one's extraverted function. Ultimately, answers to such questions need to be empirically based.

(b) Is the auxiliary of an introvert, extraverted, and that of an extravert, introverted? Further, is the auxiliary complementary to, or antagonistic to, the dominant?

At the theoretical level, the differences between Myers' theory and Jungian theory have been acknowledged; specifically, that Jungians tend to assert that the auxiliary is of the same attitude as the dominant. In the discussions of Gray and Wheelwright (1946) and Whitmont (1969), the auxiliary is seen as having the same attitude as the dominant function. However, as Quenk (1984, p. 7) states, "few references to the auxiliary function" can be found in the Jungian typology literature. The argument has been made by Myers that it is implicit in Jung's writings that the auxiliary is of a different attitude than the dominant (Myers, 1980). The specific quotation she asserts from is as follows: "The rule holds good that, besides the conscious, primary function, there is a relatively unconscious auxiliary function which is in every respect different from the nature of the primary function" (Jung, 1971, pp. 405-406). Myers argues from this, in particular from the phrase "is in every respect different," that Jung is saying that the attitude of the auxiliary complements the attitude of the dominant and, therefore, is in the opposite attitude (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Quenk logically deduces a similar view. However, to Jungians it is clear that the body of Jung's writing does not suggest such an interpretation.

One explanation for the different interpretations with respect to the attitude of the auxiliary is that Jung tended to assume that only the dominant would clearly be in the conscious sphere, and that the other three functions would be more, if not completely, unconscious. Jung (1971) describes "the effects regularly produced on the other functions when preference is given to one function. They remain in a more or less primitive and infantile state, often only half conscious or even quite unconscious" (p. 540). If the person were characterised as introverted and, hence, the introverted attitude as conscious, then all the functions in the unconscious would be extraverted. One could then infer, even though Jung did not state it explicitly, that whatever is in the conscious sphere would take on an introverted attitude. It is also arguable that for Jung only the dominant is truly in the conscious sphere; in general one would not expect the auxiliary to be so, or to be treated as such. This is different from the assumptions implicit in the form in which the MBTI profile is presented—i.e., that the two preferred functions (the dominant and the auxiliary) are both in the conscious sphere.

The second critical difference with Jung is that the Myers notion that the conscious sphere need not be wholly introverted and, hence, every such function introverted (or extraverted, as the case may be). Myers, in contrast, is arguing that one could have both an introverted function and an extraverted function "developed" [i.e., in the conscious sphere (Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Myers, 1980)].

Thus, this may not be so much an argument about the attitude of the dominant versus the auxiliary, but one concerning first the attitude of consciousness versus that of unconsciousness, and secondly, whether the auxiliary is considered conscious or unconscious. Given Jung's (1971) premise that the auxiliary is primarily unconscious, its attitude would of necessity be "in every respect different" from the attitude of the dominant. By definition, it must be extraverted. However, this is because the auxiliary is in the unconscious, not because the attitude of the auxiliary needs to "balance" that of the dominant. The latter idea is not part of Jung's argument, but part of Myers'.

An additional component of the theory concerning the auxiliary, which may be more problematic, is the assumption that the auxiliary is complementary to, and supportive of, the dominant. This also seems implicit in von Franz and Hillman (1979). Yet, a function that is, by definition, perceiving, might be antagonistic to a function that is, by definition, judging in orientation. (A similar argument applies to the no-
tion that an introverted function might be antagonistic to an extraverted one.) These two opposite stances of a perceiving and judging orientation are assumed, in Myers' theory, to provide balance and to complement each other but only when expressed as a dominant and auxiliary function. Myers and Myers (1980) state that the "two skilled processes can develop side by side because they are not antagonistic" (p. 183, italics added). Yet, when describing the J-P dimension in itself, Myers and Myers describe the fundamental opposition between the two attitudes. However, for the dominant and auxiliary this notion of opposition (between a perceiving function and a judging function) is not discussed. On the contrary, it is stated that "one is always a perceptive process and the other a judging process so they do not contradict each other" (p. 183). Even within Myers' theory, this seems inconsistent. Further, since in all Jung's theory opposites may be either complementary or antagonistic, this is an assumption which is logically inconsistent within the framework of Jung's overall theory of the psyche. (While this may partly be due to the distinction between the J-P dimension reflecting attitudes, and the judging and perceiving functions representing mental processes, one might still expect potential conflict between different processes even if not the clash of opposites.)

In discussing Jung's notion of opposites, Jarrett (1979) points out that feeling and thinking are "opposite to the other opposing pair, sensation and intuition" (p. 323), since they are rational as opposed to irrational. The terms rational and irrational were not simply abstract classification terms, but imparted meaning that conveyed their opposition (Jung, 1971). "The irrational functions, sensation and intuition . . . are those whose aim is pure perception; for, as far as possible, they are forced to dispense with the rational (which presupposes the exclusion of everything that is outside reason) in order to attain the most complete perception of the general flux of events" (p. 459, italics in the original). Similarly, intuition and sensation "by their very nature, . . . will react to every possible occurrence and be attuned to the absolutely contingent, and must therefore lack all rational direction. For this reason I call them irrational functions, as opposed to thinking and feeling, which find fulfillment only when they are in complete harmony with laws of reason" (p. 455). Given this profound difference in the nature of the rational functions and the irrational functions, one would theoretically deduce that an auxiliary might well act in a way which is not merely complementary to, but hostile to, the intent of the dominant.

Thus, at a theoretical level the question of the attitude of the auxiliary as well as whether it can be antagonistic or "opposed to" the dominant, is open for debate.

To my knowledge, the structural property of Myers' theory with respect to the attitude of the auxiliary has not been validated. Indeed, this tenet of Myers' theory is not operationalised as such, but is an artifact of the resultant profile. One's interpretation of the profile derives from the theory, even if this has no direct expression in the measure. Given the immense difficulties in operationalising such a notion, the statement above need not be seen as a criticism. It is a fact, however.

Similarly, the theoretical assumption that the auxiliary provides balance to the dominant rather than challenges it in an antagonistic fashion, is another area needing empirical support.

(c) Is everybody a type?

One of Jung's basic premises was that not everyone should be considered or treated as a type. He was particularly explicit about this when talking of extraversion and introversion. For example, he stated that "It gradually became clear to me that there must be two fundamentally different general attitudes which would divide human beings into two groups—provided the whole of humanity consisted of highly differentiated individuals. Since this is obviously not the case, one can only say that this difference of attitude becomes plainly observable only when we are confronted with a comparatively well-differentiated personality; in other words, it becomes of practical importance only after a certain degree of differentiation has been reached" (Jung, 1971, p. 549, italics added). He suggested that not everyone was extraverted or introverted.

"There is . . . a third group, and here it is hard to say whether the motivation comes chiefly from within or without. This group is the most numerous and includes the less differentiated normal man, who is considered normal either because he allows himself no excesses or because he has no need of them. The normal man is, by definition, influenced as much from within as from without. He constitutes the extensive middle group, on one side of which are those whose motivations are determined mainly by the external object, and, on the other, those whose motivations are determined from within. I call the first group extraverted, and the second group introverted" (Jung, 1971, p. 516, italics in the original).

This statement could be interpreted as meaning simply that the attitude of this "third group" is difficult to detect, rather than non-existent. Yet, it is very clear in his descriptions of the attitude-types and function-types, that one should only be treated as a type when one's use of that attitude or function is habitual. Otherwise, one is not a type; e.g., "when orientation by the object predominates in such a way that decisions and actions are determined not by sub-
jective views but by objective conditions, we speak of an extraverted attitude. *When this is habitual, we speak of an extraverted type* (Jung, 1971, p. 333, italics added). Similarly, he stated that “Introversion and extraversion are not traits of character at all, but mechanisms which can, as it were, be switched on or off at will. Only from their habitual predominance do the corresponding characters develop” (Jung, 1971, pp. 285-286). In Jung’s later writing, his explicit definition of type is as follows: “When any of these four basic psychological functions is habitual, thus setting a definite stamp on the character of the individual, I speak of a psychological type” (Jung, 1971, p. 482, italics in the original).

While Jung posited the attitudes and functions as being dichotomous at any one point in time, this is different from an argument for the existence of dichotomous *types*. For example, while sensing and intuition are opposites as functions (which can be termed dichotomous) and, at any one point in time one must use one or the other by definition, this is not the same thing as saying that people are either sensing types or intuitive types. (Note, however, that the notion that the opposites must always exclude each other is not always accepted by Jungians. See, for example, Jarrett, 1979.) It is the distinction between preferred use of a function per se and being a type that is critical in Jungian theory.

Further, it is only *habitual* use of a function that equates with being a “type,” while in MBTI theory, it is a preference, however slight, which equates with being one type rather than another. In contrasting Jung’s and Myers’ views, McCrae and Costa (1989, p. 20) state that “Jung himself appears to adopt this [trait] position in some of his writings, admitting that there are intermediate positions between pure introversion and pure extraversion, in which individuals are ‘influenced as much from within as from without’ (1971, p. 516). The authors of the MBTI, however, have adopted the interpretation that types are mutually exclusive groups of people, and that the cutting point between them is not arbitrary, but a true zero point.”

In summary, it is arguable that every person either is, or should be treated as if he or she were, one type or another. Instead, there would appear to be middle ground. Jung’s theoretical position appeared to be that this “middle ground” consisted of two groups: one where the two functions (or attitudes) were not clearly differentiated at all, and the other where the two functions were both equally developed (cf. Saunders, 1988).

Validation of this tenet of Myers’ theory, i.e., that everyone is a type, has been limited, and the evidence equivocal. As Coan (1978, p. 630) states, “the empirical support for the true dichotomy” is tenuous. There is a considerable difference between: (a) providing support for the notion that types exist, and (b) providing support for the notion that everyone is one type or another. The latter is mutually exhaustive; the former is not. Thus, studies indicating the existence of personality types do not validate the notion of dichotomous types (e.g., Bradway, 1964; Gorlow, Simpson, & Krauss, 1966; Stephenson, 1939).

Alternatively, as Myers reported in the 1962 and 1985 *Manuals* (Myers, 1962; Myers & McCaulley, 1985), examination might require regressions of one variable onto the continuous scales of the MBTI to see if a discontinuous pattern occurred at the midpoint. Earlier consideration of this structural property of the theory has not been continued, with a few rare exceptions (Hicks, 1985). However, there is much to question in the studies reported in both *Manuals*. While a full discussion of this is not the focus of the present paper, it needs to at least be noted that the hypothesis of dichotomous types is precisely that—an hypothesis.

Certainly one cannot accept non-linearity in the regressions shown in either *Manual* as sufficient justification for bipolarity or dichotomy. All that non-linearity does is indicate that the underlying sample, on that measurement, is not behaving in a linear fashion, which one might expect if it were a homogeneous group (Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960). Siegel (1963) concluded that while “disparate and discontinuous regressions . . . could be indices . . . these could also result from special characteristics of dependent variable distributions (e.g., bimodality and skewness) and the size of the interval chosen for plots” (p. 307, italics in the original).

Even for some of the studies claimed to show the disparity in the regression (e.g., Figure 9.1 in the 1985 *Manual*), the effect is extremely subtle, and it is stated that “for such small differences to be visible, samples of 4000-5000 are needed” (Myers & McCaulley, 1985, p. 158). De Vito (1985) and McCrae and Costa (1989) appear similarly unconvinced by the evidence in the *Manual* on this issue.

One objection to accepting the regressions as supporting the assumption of dichotomous types is that many of the tables seem to show greater support for the hypothesis of three types rather than two types. Yet this alternative interpretation of the data is not discussed. Given the distinctions made earlier between Jungian theory and Myers’ theory, such a consideration might seem justified. The alternative hypothesis would be that there are three groups (or three “types,” in a sense): one an extraverted (or sensing or thinking) type, the second an introverted (or intuitive or feeling) type, and the third a group that isn’t typed because its preferences are not habitual.

One might then test whether the proposition that there exist two dichotomous types explains a set of data better than the proposition that there exist three type groups; e.g., using Jung’s terminology, there ex-
ists an extraverted group (those who *habitually* adopt an extraverted attitude), an introverted group (those who *habitually* adopt an introverted attitude), and a middle group (those who do not have an habitual stance either way).

It should be noted that Myers originally included indeterminacy as a type, with x used in the MBTI profile to indicate this. However, this appeared to result in a too-complex formula, and too many types (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Operationally, we could measure this third group on mid-range scores. On the theoretical assumption that there are only two types, one interprets mid-range scores as meaning "indeterminant" type, where people aren't "clear about their preference." Instead, on the theoretical assumption that there are three groups, a mid-range group could be very clear about its preference, which is to choose both. A mid-range person need not be considered an indeterminate type at all but, rather, a quite distinct type. Alternatively, and closer to Jung's writing, is the notion that the "non-habitual" group consists of two sub-groups, one consisting of people who choose and use both attitudes (or functions), and the other of people who choose and use neither in a differentiated way.

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, establishing empirically that the MBTI is operationalising two dichotomous groups is a formidable task. The argument of this paper rests more with an assumption that this has been done, that it is not still a legitimate subject for debate. In particular, the 1962 Manual illustrates the self-critical, rigorous, and objective analysis Myers herself applied to this issue.

A complicating factor is that the actual distributions of the scales tend to be closer to the normal or are at least platykurtic, rather than the bimodal distribution desired, in spite of the procedures in construction expressly designed to force individuals into an either/or camp. (Note that Table 5.2 of the 1985 Manual presents a limited distribution of the four scales but has unequal intervals; i.e., the "clear" interval comprises twice as many preference points as the preceding intervals, which serves to artificially stretch the distribution away from the midpoint.)

For McCrae and Costa (1989), the "most persuasive evidence" for the assumption of dichotomy would be a clear bimodal distribution of preference scores. Indeed, there are explanations for why this might not happen, which are consistent with an underlying hypothesis of dichotomous types: notably, that it is because of large numbers of people being unclear about their type. Whether this explanation is true or not, we don't know. It may be, or it may be a rationalisation of the data to fit the theory. In general, on this issue we are left with a situation not much changed from that described by Stricker and Ross (1964b), who called for "the desirability of more investigations in this area" (p. 69).

A final related point to be made on this issue is not so much whether the assumption of dichotomous type has been validated but whether, given that assumption, it has been correctly operationalised. This involves examining the positioning of the midpoint. Even accepting the assumption of dichotomous types, the MBTI may not have operationalised the midpoint at the correct place. Perhaps it's wrong. Again, the evidence is limited and has not always provided support. This remains an area that is critically in need of further empirical validation. Yet, as an unresolved issue with the MBTI, it is rarely mentioned.

(d) Should the MBTI be used outside the context of Jungian theory?

In MBTI writings and applications there appears to be a concentration on the *behavioural, conscious, and cognitive* aspects of Jung's theory. However, these are partial and probably less important aspects than those which form the heart of Jungian theory. In what follows I shall attempt to illustrate the difficulties of using the MBTI outside of the context of Jung's theory. By this, I mean not just Jung's theory of types, but his general theory of psyche. (See, in particular, Jung, 1959, 1966, and 1968.) The general argument is that it is conceptually and practically necessary to use the MBTI only within the context of Jung's general theory of the dynamics of the psyche. This is a wider argument than that of using the MBTI with reference to Jung's typological writings. Five separate items are addressed.

(i) The first issue addressed is the formulation of an individual's MBTI profile by only the conscious "shorthand," i.e., ENFP or ISTJ. One's "type" is specified by the most preferred functions and attitudes, which are assumed to be conscious when in fact only one, or three, or none may be conscious. In Jungian theory, it is degree of development or differentiation of the functions with which type theory is concerned, not simply preference. Having a function or attitude in the conscious sphere means that it is differentiated, not merely that it is preferred to its opposite (Jung, 1971). The differences between types are not so much due to "basic differences in the way individuals prefer to use their perception and judgment" (Myers & McCaulley, 1985, p. 1), but due to basic differences in the way individuals have *developed* the respective functions and attitudes. Development of a function is definitional, not merely a probable outcome of an underlying preference (cf. Myers & McCaulley, 1985, p. 3). If the MBTI were an operationalisation of Jung's theory of types rather than Myers' theory of types, it would be a *direct measure* of how developed the functions were, and it would be intended that it be such a measure. Thus, a statement that "Type theory teach-
es that people are born with natural preferences [and] external influences can cause individuals to use preferences other than their natural ones” (Hirsh & Kummerow, 1989, p. 271) is a reflection of Myers’ type theory more than Jung’s and should be specified as such. Moreover, the verbal or written formulation that emerges as one’s “type” is just a shorthand for the complex interaction of all eight attitudes and functions. Even when lip-service is paid to recognition of this “underside,” it is the shorthand only that is often taken into account. Yet, this may be a far greater determinant of an individual’s behaviour than the conscious functions, which account for the proverbial tip of the iceberg. As Jung (1959) says, “Consciousness grows out of the unconscious psyche which is older than it, and which goes on functioning together with or even in spite of it” (p. 281).

Since the conscious “preferred” components of the typed profile are usually what the individual has come to associate with as being “me,” or his or her personality, this issue is problematic, since one of the great benefits of the MBTI is self-validation. Yet, the more explicitly and strongly the preference is consciously “owned” and emphasised, the more likely it is for the ego to become identified with the idea that is “who I am” and, as a result, for the person to be influenced by the shadow aspect. In other words, it is possible that the more people are encouraged to think that they “are” the letters which emerge in the shorthand description of their type, the more trouble is likely to brew in the unconscious. Therefore, at its simplest it may be necessary to consider the formulation by which one specifies an MBTI profile.

(ii) The second issue arises from the different notions in Myers and Jung of the nature of “balance” in the psyche. The emphasis in Myers compared with Jung is with the conscious sphere relative to the unconscious. This is expressed most clearly in Myers and Myers (1980) as: “For people to be balanced, they need adequate (but by no means equal) development of a second process . . . as a welcome auxiliary” (p. 12). Well-balanced people “have an auxiliary developed well enough to provide a balance between judgment and perception and between introversion and extraversion” (p. 17, italics in the original). In other words, balance is defined primarily in terms of a way of being within the conscious sphere.

This is not to say that the unconscious functions are ignored. On the contrary, Myers’ theory recognizes quite clearly that the tertiary and inferior are in the unconscious and need to be dealt with, but integrating them is not an essential precondition for balance to have been obtained. For example, McCaulley (1981) specifies that “When both the dominant and the auxiliary functions have become differentiated, the individual achieves a balance” (p. 301, italics added).

However, for Jung “balance” does not occur within the conscious sphere but between the conscious and the unconscious. One moves toward balance between one’s extraverted and introverted sides, by attending to the opposite in one’s unconscious, not through an auxiliary being brought into the conscious sphere. As indicated earlier, the notion of an auxiliary function, by virtue of its being an extraverted function, balancing an introverted function in consciousness is not present in Jung’s theory. It may indeed be that it is necessary to have a developed auxiliary to provide balance in the way Myers meant. The point is not that this is incorrect, but that it is a very different conception of the notion of “balance in the psyche” than is described in Jung. For Jung, the auxiliary provided a counterbalance along with the tertiary and inferior, because they were all relatively unconscious.

Similarly, the notion of balance being “obtained” at any particular point is difficult to apply to Jung’s theory. There, balance is never achieved as a state, but describes the nature of a perennial process.

Further, the notion of balance in Jung’s theory makes sense only within the larger context of the notions of wholeness, integration, and the individuation process. To talk of “balancing the functions” has no meaning without reference to the starting point—i.e., that the dynamic of the psyche revolves around the interrelation of consciousness and unconsciousness, and that the purpose of balance is a larger meta-purpose of a shift in ground from one way of being to another (Jung, 1959). (This notion is developed more in the third aspect discussed below.) For the present argument, what is critical is that obtaining (or moving towards) a degree of balance in the development of functions is only a means to a larger and deeper end, not an end in itself.

(iii) The third issue concerns type development and follows from the preceding discussion. Note that the second aspect, relating to the differing notions of balance in the psyche, has required reference to the more important underlying drive called individuation. Individuation is sometimes thought of by MBTI practitioners as being the same as type development. However, individuation involves something more important than the development of the four functions. It involves also the shift in the focal point of the psyche from the ego to the Self. [The Self is defined by Jung (1971) as, “the unity of the personality as a whole” (p. 460), the centre of the conscious and unconsciousness spheres. In contrast, the ego is considered to be the “centre of my field of consciousness” (p. 425).]

This notion is not simply a theoretical extra. To discuss type development without including the notions of the Self becoming more integrated, or for a shift in ground from the ego to the Self, is conceptually meaningless. It should be borne in mind that, in
the Jungian theory of the psyche, since the ego is the centre of consciousness, in Myers’ terms it would relate to only the dominant and auxiliary. On the other hand, the Self is the centre of both consciousness and unconsciousness and would relate to all four functions, the Self being connected inextricably with the “integration of the opposites.” (For a full discussion of this see Jung, 1959, Chapter VI.)

Further, individuation in Jung’s terms is the task not merely of exceptional individuals but of normal individuals, too. Note that this is in contrast to the notion in Myers’ theory described in McCaulley (1981) in terms of the MBTI’s being “concerned primarily with normal, rather than exceptional, personality development” (p. 301). Jung’s view is that “type development is a lifelong process,” whereby in midlife “some rare individuals can develop to the point where they transcend their preferences and move easily from one function to another” (p. 301).

Hillman (1972) describes the individuation process and the drive of the Self to be realised in Jung’s writing as strongly affirming “that this urge to self-realization works with the compulsiveness of an instinct. We are driven to be ourselves, the individuation process is a dynamic, not a matter of choice or for a few” (pp. 34-35, italics added).

Jung himself describes the “almost irresistible compulsion and urge to become what one is . . . . This centre [of personality] is not felt or thought of as the ego but, if one may so express it, as the Self” (Jung, 1959, p. 357). The important point is that this process of integrating all the opposite functions and attitudes, as well as the shift from the ego to the Self as the governing centre, is not for an elite few. Jung refers to the process occasionally as self-realisation and describes it as “a law of nature” (Jung, 1959, p. 170). This does not mean everybody obeys the law of nature, but all are called.

The above distinctions between Jung’s theory and Myers’ theory are not simply intellectual refinements. They have important implications for the practical use of the MBTI with individuals. This is illustrated most clearly when one is concerned with understanding or working with the tertiary and inferior functions. In much MBTI writing, the development of the tertiary and inferior functions is interpreted in terms of making them serviceable in the conscious sphere, able to adapt to situations, useful for the purposes of the ego.

However, Hillman (1972) distinguishes two approaches to adaptation. In Jungian terms “adaptation is primarily to psychic reality” (p. 185) as distinct from will and reason, which “conceived adaptation in terms of controlling and understanding reality” (p. 185). In contrast, Hirsh and Kummerow (1989) describe “good type development” as meaning that “people use their own preferences well and know when to strategize and use the other preferences appropriately” (p. 272). Similarly, Barr and Barr (1989) refer to the positive value of “balanced preferences” (p. 23 and p. 272) but seem to mean only external adaptation and success. However, this notion of type development achieves only Hillman’s second type of adaptation—i.e., meeting the demands of the external or collective situation. It is not a Jungian notion and is diametrically opposed to the essential meaning of the individuation process. The latter refers to Hillman’s first type of adaptation—i.e., to inner reality, to inner demands. Thus, type development and/or individuation cannot be explained as processes whereby an individual will be able to deal appropriately with different situations. Yet, this is commonly how type development is discussed.

The distinctions discussed above are illustrated also in differing notions of which function is “in command.” Type development is described in the Manual as requiring, in addition to the development of the dominant and auxiliary, “eventual admission of the least developed processes to conscious, purposeful use in the service of the dominant process” (p. 15, italics added). Having the least developed processes serve the dominant process means, by definition, that they are in the service of the ego and not the Self. Such a process is to be seen “from the perspective of gaining more command over all his or her powers, not only the preferred, but also the less-preferred functions when these are needed” (p. 64, italics added). Needed by whom or by what? The examples given make it clear that it is the needs of the dominant function. Further, counselors are advised to help individuals develop the less preferred functions by a strategy of using them to help achieve goals set up by the dominant and auxiliary functions.

However, with Jungian theory the notions of “controlling” the tertiary and the inferior, and that they should be in service of the superior or dominant, would be considered somewhat dangerous recipes for an individual. It is contrary to Jung’s theory for the conscious sphere to control and exert a form of command over the unconscious. (See Jung, 1959, pp. 281-282.) It is often the earnest intent of the rather small and relatively powerless ego to have the unconscious functions (as well as other contents) in service of those functions subject to its control (by definition, only those in the conscious sphere). However, it is an integral and vital part of individual development that such delusions of grandeur and mastery on the part of the ego are gradually replaced by the acceptance of a somewhat wiser authority in the form of the Self, whose concerns are often contrary to the demands of the ego and, in particular, to the supremacy of the desire for “successful” social or collective adaptation. To encourage the mastery (“command”) of the dominant function is to encourage a rebuke, in one form or
another, of a profoundly violated unconscious.

(iv) The fourth issue, related to the discussion above, is the view that one’s type is a *purposive category*. Thus, there is much advice on how MBTI profiles can be applied at a personal level to be a “good” type, how to make the most of one’s type in terms of career, and how to be a good leader. The overall lesson is how to capitalise on your type, a strategy designed to make better, more perfect, what one is consciously ego-identified as being. Within the context of the Jungian theory of the psyche, as with the examples cited above, this runs the risk of failing to assist the individual in being a “good” type, since by *suppressing* the not-me traits, they are more likely to become associated with the shadow complex rather than simply “being in the unconscious.” The more this happens, which is likely the more one tries to capitalise on one’s type, the more the shadow will upset the applecart of the ego. The shadow cannot be removed by making the conscious (or acknowledged) behaviour “better.”

To illustrate further, consider Mitroff and Kilmann’s (1975) contingency-based approach to organisational design, which uses the Jungian typological framework for defining the basic characteristics of the design. While these authors are arguably the most sophisticated and intelligent users of the MBTI in organisations, even they succumb to the tendency to deal only with the ego-based conscious aspects of type theory. They state “We should design an ST subunit to address ST problems (task environments) staffed in turn by ST individuals, and so on, and finally design various mechanisms to co-ordinate the subunits’ efforts of these different subunit designs into an overall organization effectiveness” (p. 196). An ST organisation would be characterised by an emphasis on structure and hierarchy, for example.

The problem with such an approach is not that it would mask the problems, but that it would exacerbate them. This appears to be a short-term measure at best and is to concentrate on only the *conscious* aspects of type. To isolate the STs is not going to help them confront a non-preferred or undeveloped NF side; in fact, the ST traits will most assuredly become over-emphasised if that side of them is going to be bolstered by work, tasks, colleagues, environments, and an organisational design that further encourages their ST-ness. The NF side would, no doubt, gather energy in the shadow complex, and presumably arise in uncontrollable ways in the normal shadow eruptive manner. (Bureaucracies sabotaged by chaos!) From the individual’s point of view, it is questionable to advocate a Jungian-specialised design.

(v) A final example of the effect of using the MBTI outside the context of Jungian theory stems also from emphasis on the conscious rather than the unconscious. This concerns the relative neglect of the tertiary function. (While this occurs in Jung’s writing also, particularly relative to the inferior function, the *context* for interpretation remains Jung’s whole theory of the psyche.) Most descriptions of the MBTI types, including those in *Introduction to Type* (Myers, 1987), make little, if any, reference to the tertiary. Further, discussions of the need to “balance out” one’s type concentrate on working with the inferior function, not the tertiary function. For example, the description of using type in counseling in the *Manual* advises counselors to “build on strengths to get to weakness by encouraging the client to use the dominant and auxiliary to strengthen the inferior functions” (p. 67). However, this neglects the process of approaching the inferior through the tertiary.

An alternative formulation illustrates the potential dangers of this. In Jungian terms, the third function is the potential mediator with the inferior function; i.e., one approaches the inferior safely by going through the tertiary, not by apprehending it directly. In terms of individual growth (Jaccobi, 1963), one apprehends one’s unconscious and the Self by a sequence going from the dominant to the auxiliary to the tertiary to the inferior. The danger of directly confronting the inferior function rather than using the mediating or tertiary function is that this is more likely to produce ego-inflation—i.e., when unconscious energy is brought into the conscious sphere but is controlled by the ego rather than by the Self. Further, one obtains strong transference reactions towards whoever is the change agent involved, and the inferior function will not be easily integrated [i.e., it will not “stick” (Jung, 1971)].

One application of this in the organisational world seems to have occurred with the human relations movement. This example may be completely wrong but nevertheless serves as an *explanatory vehicle* for how the path through the tertiary would work. On the assumption that the dominant mode in this world is that of thinking supported by a sensing auxiliary, the drive in the human relations field to get people in touch with their feelings represented an attempt to go straight for the inferior function. This was usually attempted in order to balance out the overly task-driven dominant thinking mode.

However, one of the most common complaints of that era in organisational training was that the individual, once out of the fully supportive atmosphere and conditions set up for the individual to get in touch with his or her feelings, returned quickly to past patterns of attitude and behaviour with others. They were unable to act out their new-found selves in the “real” world. This is precisely what one would expect if the inferior function had been tackled directly rather than going through the tertiary, although other explanations of this phenomenon would equally suffice. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the
trend in the last 5-10 years of encouraging intuition, representing the business world's tertiary function.

The practical implications of the alternative framework of addressing the inferior only through the tertiary are enormous for both organisational as well as individual change. This alternative may be completely wrong. It may be unnecessary to address the tertiary in this way. Yet, if the Jungian framework is correct, the ramifications for both individual as well as organisational change are immense.

The importance of the five aspects discussed above derives from the necessity for greater conceptual exploration and precision in the MBTI field. The main argument in each has been the necessity to re-establish a Jungian theoretical base as indispensable to any MBTI use. Without such a base, theoretical propositions relating to type development, in particular, may become skewed. The practical implications of applying type theory to individuals, without integrating this within the wider Jungian theory of the psyche, would appear to be potentially harmful.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion has attempted to illustrate some of the critical areas in the theory and use of the MBTI that still need to be addressed. The first three issues looked at areas of, or assumptions underlying, the typology that are critical to the MBTI and the theory from which it derives. Here, the attempt was to stimulate awareness of theoretical clarification needed, and some of the implications for the operationalisation of type theory with the MBTI. The argument of these three issues was that reference should be made to whether it is Jung's theory or Myers' theory being used, since in a number of vital respects the two are not the same. The MBTI is primarily an attempt to operationalise Myers' formulation.

The fourth issue, based on the idea that the MBTI has been simplified in order for its absorption or easy applicability into the "real world," is highly problematic. Perhaps it is better not to use the MBTI at all, if its use will be counter-productive. The argument in this paper has been that this is likely to occur the more that use is divorced from Jung's theory. For a theory whose intent is to be helpful and useful to individuals, use of the MBTI needs to take place only within the context of the wider underlying theory from which it sprang.

Finally, we have necessary, but not nearly sufficient, backing to the MBTI, unless one is satisfied with using the instrument as another personality trait measure. Empirical support for the distinctive typological features of Jung's theory is equivocal at best. Only consideration of the structural properties of type theory will establish the validation necessary for an instrument that has been put in the spotlight. This will only occur with greater clarification and precision of the theoretical basis underlying the MBTI.

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